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Jon Rueda* and Francisco Lara
FiloLab Scientific Unit of Excellence, Department of Philosophy, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
The history of humankind is full of examples that indicate a constant desire to make
human beings more moral. Nowadays, technological breakthroughs might have a
significant impact on our moral character and abilities. This is the case of Virtual Reality
(VR) technologies. The aim of this paper is to consider the ethical aspects of the use of VR
in enhancing empathy. First, we will offer an introduction to VR, explaining its fundamental
features, devices and concepts. Then, we will approach the characterization of VR as an
“empathy machine,” showing why this medium has aroused so much interest and why,
nevertheless, we do not believe it is the ideal way to enhance empathy. As an alternative,
we will consider fostering empathy-related abilities through virtual embodiment in avatars.
In the conclusion, however, we will, we will examine some of the serious concerns
related to the ethical relevance of empathy and will defend the philosophical case
for a reason-guided empathy, also suggesting specific guidelines for possible future
developments of empathy enhancement projects through VR embodied experiences.
Keywords: virtual reality, empathy, empathy enhancement, moral enhancement, moral psychology, neuroethics,
applied ethics, virtual embodiment
INTRODUCTION
From the very beginning, the contemporary debate on moral enhancement has predominantly
been a discussion about moral bio-enhancement, that is, the ethical considerations of using
biotechnologies such as gene editing, pharmacological drugs, or neurological interventions in
order to improve our moral behavior (Douglas, 2008, 2013; Faust, 2008; Persson and Savulescu,
2008, 2012; DeGrazia, 2014; Harris, 2016). More recently, moral enhancement through the use
of Artificial Intelligence is increasingly being considered (Whitby, 2011; Savulescu and Maslen,
2015; Klincewizc, 2016; Giubilini and Savulescu, 2017; Lara and Deckers, 2020). One of the aims of
this research paper consists of broadening the horizons of the moral enhancement debate. We will
address the use of Virtual Reality (VR) for that purpose—an increasingly popular and widespread
form of technology that may have a powerful impact on human morality.
Although several ethical issues raised by this technology have already been widely debated in
recent years1, we will focus on its use for moral enhancement, particularly on how VR could
improve empathy. Empathy has been one of the recurrent objectives of traditional moral education.
1More than two decades ago Brey (1999) warned designers and users how certain VR applications that involved performing
immoral actions in the virtual environment (e.g., pedophilia) could encourage poor treatment or real psychological harm
to people represented by abused avatars. Other ethical aspects of VR have subsequently been considered, including ethical
guidelines for research on this type of technology (Behr et al., 2005); the harm to the individual and society, especially to the
vulnerable population, derived from the emotional, cognitive, and behavioral changes of the virtual embodiment; the use of
highly persuasive technology to get others to perform immoral actions; and issues related to privacy, data sharing, and the
misuse of personal data required for the implementation of this technology (Brey, 2008;Wason, 2014; Madary andMetzinger,
2016). Slater et al. (2020) discuss how the ethical issues mentioned above could be exacerbated by the super-realism produced
by the latest developments in VR which will continue to reach even greater levels in the near future.
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We will show that VR is a technology that overcomes some of
the limitations of conventional methods that attempt to enhance
empathy. However, empathy is an important psychological ability
that is not beyond the scope of ethical controversies. The
fact that VR is a strong candidate for promoting empathy
makes the ethical scrutiny regarding its potential promises and
drawbacks in the domain of human moral enhancement even
more important2.
Our argument rests as follows. First, we will present an
overview of what VR is, the devices that make it work and
the essential concepts needed to properly understand it. In
the Virtual Reality as an “Empathy Machine” section, we will
offer a definition of empathy and present its main subtypes.
After that, we will examine the concept of VR as an “empathy
machine,” a notion which has aroused a great deal of enthusiasm
regarding the potential of this medium in a variety sectors. In
our opinion, despite the fervor unleashed in civil society by
this technology, most of the social activist projects pursuing
this concept of VR (beyond raising awareness of particular
societal problems) do not represent the most promising method
for enhancing empathy itself. This is partly because there is
little empirical evidence supporting their impact on altruistic or
prosocial motivations and because of ethical caveats regarding
the predominantly emotional content of these audiovisual
experiences. In order to overcome these previous examples, in
the Virtual Reality Embodied Perspective-Taking, we will review
an emerging experimental body of literature that is studying
the use of embodiment in different VR avatars in order to
improve mostly empathy-related phenomena. In principle, this
could be a promising way of enhancing empathy through VR
because there is evidence of their potential to reduce biases
and discriminatory attitudes and to promote morally altruistic
initiatives. In the Further Ethical Aspects: in Defense of a Reason-
Guided Empathy, we will deal with the ethical concerns that arise
in connection with the goal of fostering empathy.We will present
some of the recurrent doubts regarding the moral significance
of empathy and propose some requirements to counter these
alleged shortcomings. Above all, we will advocate a reason-
guided empathy for the development of the future attempts to
enhance empathy through embodiment in VR experiences.
VIRTUAL REALITY TECHNOLOGIES:
DEVICES AND FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS
Virtual Reality3 has historically been referred to as a set of
technologies providing immersive experiences in computer-
generated worlds. The most important features of computer-
based VR are, on the one hand, the interactivity with
digital scenarios, objects and avatars and, on the other, the
2Some biomedical tools for boosting empathy have also been proposed. For
instance, see Lara (2017) for the ethical considerations of promoting empathy
through oxytocin in the human enhancement debate. For another approach to the
ethical aspects of the biomedical enhancement of empathy, see Ray and Castillo
(2019).
3The term “Virtual Reality” was coined by Jaron Lanier in 1978 (Bailenson, 2018,
p. 174).
motion tracking that permits the rendering of movement in
a virtual environment from a first-person perspective. Today,
the increasing popularity of the display of 360◦ videos in VR
headsets has sparked debate regarding whether or not this
practice should also be considered VR. 360◦ VR films—or so-
called “cinematic VR” (Archer and Finger, 2018)—do not have
these features, but they do still offer immersive experiences.
As in computer-generated virtual environments, participants
can look in any direction inside an immersive 360◦ video by
moving their head in a natural manner, that is, supporting
sensorimotor contingencies that follow the principles of how
we perceive the real world (Slater, 2009). However, a computer-
generated world is technically more immersive than a 360◦ VR
video in the sense that the latter could be simulated by the
former, but not vice versa (Slater and Sanchez-Vives, 2016, p.
35–37; see also Slater, 2009, p. 3350–3351). This also means
that both technologies can serve different purposes; for instance,
cinematic VR has great potential for storytelling. 360◦ VR
videos sometimes have interactivity possibilities which, while
not capable of affecting the environment, do contain features
such as the ability to select different courses of action to
alter the storylines. Moreover, 360◦ video-based VR depictions
are, by default, photorealistic compared to computer-generated
graphics. In this article, we will consider VR in a broad sense that
accommodates a plurality of immersive experiences created by
different types of VR technology.
The most famous apparatus in the development of VR is the
Head Mounted Display (HMD). HMDs are helmets, goggles, or
headpieces that display images of a digitally rendered world for
each eye, creating a fully immersive experience with a three-
dimensional stereoscopic view. HMDs also provide the display
of 360◦ VR videos and are the most popular VR devices due to
the commercial success they have achieved in recent years. In a
VR multisensory experience, HMDs provide the visual element.
Sound is often transmitted by means of headphones/earphones
or an external speaker, thus helping to increase the degree of
immersion. Touch or vibrotactile signals are also part of some
VR experiences through haptic feedback devices. There are some
gadgets (handheld controllers, force-feedback joysticks, data
gloves, datasuits, etc.) which are essential to the manipulation of
virtual objects as well as for the sense of touch. Some VR labs and
room-scale VR, such as the Virtual Human Interaction Lab led by
Jeremy Bailenson at Stanford University, include a vibrating floor
and can, for instance, simulate earthquakes (Bailenson, 2018).
In summary, sight, sound, and touch are the most common
sensory base of VR experiences. The stimulation of olfactory and
gustatory senses in VR is still a subject of study rather than a
current possibility. Nevertheless, its future existence cannot be
discarded (Slater and Sanchez-Vives, 2016; Oh and Bailenson,
2017).
Along with HMDs, there are other devices that enable the
vivid illusions that VR provides. For instance, there are a variety
of devices related to motion tracking which are fundamental to
the interaction with virtual environments and to the position
and orientation of the subject. These apparatuses provide real-
time information to the computer in order to render the
virtual world in accordance with the physical movements of
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the protagonist of the experience and “to update the rendered
first-person perspective viewpoint accordingly” (Ahn et al.,
2016, p. 6). Although HMDs are in charge of the display,
VR would not be possible without the tracking and rendering
permitted by other hardware. As Oh and Bailenson (2017, p. 2)
note: “[t]here are different types of tracking systems: marker-
based systems (e.g., with mechanical, magnetic, optical, inertial
trackers), computer vision systems (e.g., Microsoft Kinect), and
data gloves.” Body-tracking suits are also noteworthy in this
aspect (Peck et al., 2013, p. 780).
In this article, we are particularly interested in highlighting the
importance of HMDs because the expression “empathymachine,”
as well as the experiments that we will address in the Virtual
Reality Embodied Perspective-Taking, are based on this VR
technology. Still, it should not be forgotten that there are other
types of VR systems which are not HMDs but are nevertheless
important in the historical development of VR and are still being
used in some labs as well as in commercial applications. There
are various technologies that permit navigation, exploration,
and interaction in virtual scenarios. For instance, the Cave
Automatic Virtual Environment (CAVE) is a virtual, immersive
and interactive space (Cruz-Neira et al., 1993). The CAVE system
is based on a cube-shaped room where videos and virtual
representations are projected on the walls. A special type of
glasses allow for the visualization of objects in three dimensions.
In fact, CAVEs “became one of the mainstays of VR research
and applications from the late 1990s and through the 2000s until
recently” (Slater and Sanchez-Vives, 2016, p. 4). Furthermore, the
use of desktop VR, based on two-dimensional computer screens,
is also worth noting (Parsons, 2015, p. 2). These examples are
less immersive than HMDs on a “scale of immersiveness,” as
Slater and Sanchez-Vives (2016) point out, because an HMD
could simulate a virtual experience of a CAVE or a desktop VR,
but not vice versa. Recently, specific types of cardboard have
also been used as a rudimentary but economical way to provide
virtual experiences. Cardboards are easy to assemble and low-cost
headset platforms that work with smartphones and mobile apps,
providing a 3D stereoscopic view. Moreover, market forces are
driving the innovation of updates that aim to improve the VR
experiences of home users at more affordable prices. There are
now all-in-one headsets available (e.g., Oculus Go or Quest) that
do not require VR-enabled PCs or smartphones and which offer
high-quality immersive experiences more accessible to a broader
audience. With these examples, far from an exhaustive list, we
hope to have provided a general conception of the rich field of
VR technologies.
Based on the above review of the main devices usually
included under the category of VR, we will now introduce
the main characteristics that allow us to unify them under
such a denomination and to distinguish them from one
another according to the degree to which they possess these
differentiating properties.
One important characteristic of VR is immersion. Immersion
refers to “the technical capability of the system to deliver
a surrounding and convincing environment with which the
participant can interact” (Sánchez-Vives and Slater, 2005, p. 333).
Immersion is a technological quality that may differ from
one type of VR system to another. It is dependent on the
technological affordances of each VR system (Slater and Sanchez-
Vives, 2016). Some VR systems have characteristics (e.g., higher
display resolution, more extensive tracking) that qualify them as
more immersive than others. Thus, there are different degrees
of immersion that can be measured in an objective manner,
regardless of the human experience that it provokes (Sánchez-
Vives and Slater, 2005; Oh and Bailenson, 2017; Herrera
et al., 2018). It is measurable because immersion refers to the
technological quality of the media of a particular VR apparatus
in relation to its capacity to remove us from the physical reality4
and therefore elicit different levels of presence. According to
Cummings and Bailenson (2016), immersion can be measured
by taking into account different variables, such as tracking level,
stereoscopic vision, image quality, field of view, sound quality,
user perspective, resolution, etc.
Immersive systems and their particular technological
affordances also support a set of valid actions known
as sensorimotor contingencies (Slater, 2009). For instance,
participants using immersive headsets such as HMDs rapidly
learn the effects of head movement in gaze direction because the
head tracking system renders the visual perception according
to the real movements of the user. However, imagine that the
participant reaches to grasp a virtual object; in the absence of a
haptic system or data glove, it will be impossible to feel anything
because the manipulation of objects and the sense of touch are
not valid sensorimotor contingencies in that VR experience. That
said, the technological affordances of immersive VR can create
realistic illusions and sensorimotor contingencies that other
technology-based mediums such as desktops or TVs cannot
simulate to the same degree. This is because theoretically, in
principle, it is possible to create Immersive Virtual Environments
(IVEs) in which to “fully simulate what it is like to go into
a non-immersive system” (Slater, 2009, p. 3350). Moreover, a
commonly held belief is that IVEs offermultisensory experiences,
free navigation, and interactive possibilities in three-dimensional
and digitally-rendered worlds from a first-person perspective,
as if we were in the physical reality, but without being exactly
in the physical reality (Bailey et al., 2014, p. 573; Ahn et al.,
2016, p. 2; Oh et al., 2016, p. 400; Herrera et al., 2018, p. 4). This
contraposition between the virtual world and the physical or
non-virtual world is a core characteristic of immersion.
Another characteristic of VR is presence. This refers to the
psychological experience of “being there” (Heeter, 1992). In
virtual environments, presence is understood as place illusion—
the qualia of being located inside the virtual word (Slater, 2009).
In contrast to immersion, presence is considered a subjective
factor (Sánchez-Vives and Slater, 2005; Oh and Bailenson, 2017).
If immersion is the technical capability of the VR technology,
presence is the psychological response to it (Sánchez-Vives and
Slater, 2005). Consequently, the sense of presence is conditioned
by the degree of immersion that each VR technology can offer.
4This is the biggest difference between Virtual Reality and Augmented Reality:
“[i]n contrast to VR, which attempts to completely block out the physical world,
AR refers to the overlaying of virtual objects onto the physical world” (Oh and
Bailenson, 2017, p. 3).
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org 3 November 2020 | Volume 7 | Article 506984
Rueda and Lara Virtual Reality and Empathy Enhancement
For instance, technological affordances such as tracking level,
wider fields of view of the display and the use of stereoscopic
visuals are generally more impactful with regard to the sense of
presence than the quality of visual images or auditory content
(Cummings and Bailenson, 2016). Furthermore, presence is
related to the extent to which VR users feel that they are
in a specific environment (Shriram et al., 2017, p. 312). One
interesting point is that, when the feeling of presence is well-
achieved, IVE participants react, behave and feel as if they were in
non-virtual situations (Slater et al., 2006; Felnhofer et al., 2015, p.
49; Oh and Bailenson, 2017, p. 6–7). Our motor, perceptual and
physiological systems function in virtual scenarios in the same
way that they do in the “real world” (Bailenson, 2018, p. 19–
20). The subjective illusion of presence, the sensation of “being
there,” is one of the psychological features that makes VR work,
“in spite of the fact that you know for sure that you are not actually
there” (Slater and Sanchez-Vives, 2016, p. 5, italics in the original
source). It is therefore not an exaggeration to claim that “presence
is the sine qua non of VR” (Bailenson, 2018, p. 19).
In addition, there is another subjective experience that VR
can create, through the use of HMDs, which is the sense of
embodiment. Embodiment is the sense of experiencing the body
(or some body parts) as “one’s own” —such that this type of
bodily illusion is also frequently referred as “body ownership.”
The feeling of body ownership can be achieved by inhabiting
other avatars. Avatars are digital representations that participants
of VR experiences can control with their actions (Won et al.,
2015b, p. 6). The body transfer to an avatar consists of replacing
our physical body with a virtual one. One of the building blocks
to obtaining a “full body ownership illusion” is the first-person
perspective (Maselli and Slater, 2013), since visual confirmation
of the body substitution is one of the grounds for the virtual
body transfer (Slater et al., 2010; Banakou et al., 2016, p. 7; Slater
and Sanchez-Vives, 2016, p. 8). Another underlying mechanism
of the sense of embodiment is congruent body tracking (Maselli
and Slater, 2013). The tracking and rendering systems allow
the VR headset to display the synchronized movements of our
“real bodies” and the virtual ones. In other words, an accurate
tracking of the congruent visual motor correlations between
the “real body” and the fake virtual body are important to
induce embodiment. For instance, the use of mirrors in virtual
experiences is very common in order to familiarize participants
with their novel virtual appearance and to confirm that the
virtual bodymoves synchronously with the physical one. Another
mechanism that induces the sense of embodiment is agency; that
is, experiencing the ability to control the body in order to act
in the virtual environment leads to stronger body ownership
illusions (Seinfeld et al., 2020). Most importantly, it could be said
that a realistic sense of body ownership has been achieved when
the body transfer causes “the brain to generate the illusion that
the virtual body is one’s own” (Slater et al., 2010, p. 6), or, what is
almost the same, that the “person has become the virtual body”
(Ahn et al., 2016, p. 4).
This fact is very important because several studies have
provided supporting evidence that changing the virtual body
can lead to changes in self-conception (see Maister et al.,
2015). The process of self-identification with the virtual avatar
alters social cognition and behavior in IVEs and, as we will
see with some virtual embodiment experiments in the Virtual
Reality Embodied Perspective-Taking, some changes can even be
detected in the implicit attitudes in the “real world” following
a virtual experience. Yee and Bailenson (2007) coined the term
“proteus effect” to explain these phenomena of digital self-
transformation. The proteus effect refers to the psychological
phenomenon of how changing our self-identity for another social
representation can accordingly change our behavior because the
subject ascribes the social stereotypes and beliefs linked to the
novel identity adopted. Yee and Bailenson (2007) studied, for
instance, how embodying an attractive virtual avatar leads to
more confident behavior and, from proxemics point of view,
stepping closer into the personal space of the virtual interlocutor.
Although it was originally conceived to explain the behavior-
altering effects of using virtual avatars in computer games, there
is evidence that the proteus effect also applies to fully embodied
VR experiences (see Farmer andMaister, 2017). If an avatar is the
primary identity of the virtual participant (Yee and Bailenson,
2007), the user might assume some of the semantic properties,
implicit attitudes and behaviors that are often represented by
that social identity when the sense of embodiment occurs in an
avatar with out-group visual appearance (Seinfeld et al., 2020).
Similarly, with regard to the potential of virtual embodiment to
significantly alter social cognition and behavior, in the Virtual
Reality Embodied Perspective-Taking we will address a series
of experiments that show the potential of VR for promoting
empathic perspective-taking or altruistic motivations through
the embodiment of participants in other virtual avatars.
Moreover, body transfer might be provoked even if the virtual
avatar does not have a human appearance. Jaron Lanier invented
the expression “homuncular flexibility” to refer to the high
malleability of our body schema in VR experiences (Won et al.,
2015a,b). We have the mental plasticity to adopt different virtual
body representations that are not necessarily human, or that
look like humans but have, for instance, a third arm, or even
stranger experiences such as having eight limbs like a lobster
(Won et al., 2015b). However, human-like bodily appearance
is one of the building blocks of full body ownership illusion
(Maselli and Slater, 2013), meaning that the sense of embodiment
may decrease in non-human avatars compared to realistic virtual
human bodies (see also Seinfeld et al., 2018).
Finally, the last point of this characterization of VR is
related to this same idea of “unnatural” experiences. VR is an
experience generator (Bailenson, 2018, p. 46) and a simulation
medium (Ramirez and LaBarge, 2018). It offers the possibility
of simulating events that may be experienced in physical reality.
VR is, in this way, a simulation medium because it can mimic
experiences that have their equivalent in the “real world.”
However, VR is not confined to the reproduction of “real”
events, objects or experiences. The potentials and perils of VR
are enormous because it can be used to simulate experiences
that are part of our common reality, situations that we are
unlikely to experience in our lives or even situations that are
simply impossible to experience in physical reality (Slater and
Sanchez-Vives, 2016). The possible experiences that may be
achieved in VR are therefore almost infinite (Oh and Bailenson,
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2017, p. 7). What could be experienced in VR is subject to
human imagination, VR designers and content developers, but
what should be experienced in VR is an issue that must be
discussed from an ethical perspective. In the next two sections
we will examine how VR could be used to intentionally promote
empathy, addressing the ethical considerations that arise as a
consequence of this goal.
VIRTUAL REALITY AS AN “EMPATHY
MACHINE”
In this Virtual Reality as an “Empathy Machine” section
we will approach the characterization of VR as an empathy
machine. First, we will define empathy and introduce its
main subtypes. Then, we will explain the origin of the
tag “empathy machine,” offering some examples of visual
artists, storytellers and organizations that have enthusiastically
embraced this conception of VR. VR is, in this sense, an appealing
communication medium for those wishing to offer powerful
narratives or captivating experiences, opening new perspectives
to address social and environmental problems. Nevertheless, we
will argue that, from an ethical standpoint, this is not the most
reliable way to enhance empathy.
Empathy is an ability that encompasses diverse psychological
processes related to sharing and understanding the internal
(mainly affective) mental states of other (not only human) beings.
Nonetheless, it is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. The
different uses assigned to the term “empathy” often elicit non-
equivalent meanings (Batson, 2009; Cuff et al., 2016). Thus,
according to the widely used model formulated by Davis (1980),
we can distinguish, in principle, four differentiable types of
empathy: fantasy (necessary to identify with fictitious characters),
empathic concern, personal distress, and perspective-taking.
However, in the literature regarding VR and empathy, there
has been a general tendency to focus on the two latter types
due to the simpler distinction between emotional empathy
(personal distress) and cognitive empathy (perspective-taking)
(Fisher, 2017, p. 236–237; Ramirez, 2017, p. 510–511; Hamilton-
Giachritsis et al., 2018, p. 2; Francis et al., 2018, p. 5; Seinfeld et al.,
2018, p. 1; van Loon et al., 2018, p. 2; Bailenson, 2018, p. 79–80;
Schoeller et al., 2019, p. 1)5.
On the one hand, personal distress would be the emotional
empathy par excellence. It is a reflexive and spontaneous
disposition that leads to the mirroring or contagion of other
people’s negative affective states (emotions such as suffering,
sorrow, etc.). It allows one to share the feelings of another,
together with a clear and simultaneous self-other distinction
5Another distinction worth bearing in mind in this discussion is between
dispositional and situational empathy. Dispositional, or so-called trait empathy,
refers to individual stable characteristics that can be self-reported to measure the
propensity of a person for empathy. By contrast, situational, or state empathy refers
to the variable level of empathy that may be experienced according to a particular
situation and context. One of the uncertainties is whether recurrent exposure to
VR situations, in which empathy is directly elicited, might result in a significant
increase in the dispositional traits of empathy in the medium or long-term. For
that discussion see https://virtualrealitypop.com/measuring-empathy-in-virtual-
reality-678dd02eac61 (accessed January 11, 2020).
(Bertrand et al., 2018; Schoeller et al., 2019). By “share” we do
not mean experiencing exactly the same feeling, but having at
least an “image” or a “sensuous representation” of what the other
person is feeling (Persson and Savulescu, 2018, p. 186). In many
cases, this disposition of contagion is facilitated by an instinctive
imitation of bodily postures (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999), facial
expressions (Ekman, 1992; Ekman and Davidson, 1993), and
emotional tone when talking to others (Neumann and Strack,
2000). The emotions aroused by the contagion entail a personal
distress which, in a desperate and self-interested attempt to evade
it, can lead to involvement in order to alleviate the pain of the
other (Batson, 1991; Batson and Oleson, 1991).
On the other hand, perspective-taking is understood as the
active effort to put oneself in another person’s shoes, thinking
about the causes of the other person’s affective states, or
just trying to imagine how one can adopt the other person’s
beliefs and states. This is a less spontaneous and less “selfish”
psychological disposition. As such, the observer reacts based on
what the other says and does, as well as his or her own knowledge
of the person’s character, values and desires (Darwall, 1998). It is
therefore an essentially cognitive form of empathy.
Actually, (Bailenson, 2018, p. 79–80; following Zaki, 2014)
also refers to a third type of empathy, which is mainly
motivational. It is similar to the one that Davis (1980) called
“empathic concern.” Davis defined it as the tendency to
experience feelings of warmth, compassion and concern for
others undergoing negative experiences. In the case of the
person showing empathic concern, there is therefore an attempt
to adopt the perspective of the other who is motivated by
an interest in his or her well-being. Here, the predominant
element is not the personal point of view of the observer but
rather the impersonal point of view from which one matters
as much as the other (Darwall, 1998, p. 263). The aim is to
feel on the behalf of the other (Zahn-Waxler and Robinson,
1995). Precisely because of this, this type of empathy is the
core source of altruistic motivation in Batson’s (1991), 2015)
“empathy-altruism hypothesis.” This third motivational type of
empathy, while primarily emotional, can be elicited by either of
the aforementioned types. Moreover, we should bear in mind
that empathy “in its fullest form includes both the cognitive and
affective dimensions” (Simmons, 2014, p. 98). These dimensions
are sometimes difficult to delineate plainly and there are cases
in which they can overlap. For instance, a cognitive exercise
of perspective-taking might lead to a better recognition of the
emotions of other beings6, with the subsequent motivation due
to the concern for their suffering. Therefore, although it is
important to differentiate these types of empathy, it should not
be neglected that they are not only intertwined but also frequently
co-present (Read, 2019).
Now, the cliché spread by the idea that VR is an empathy
machine has not been popularized from the academic sphere.
6A similar case will be shown in the Virtual Reality Embodied Perspective-Taking,
in Seinfeld’s et al. (2018) experiment, in which male abusers embodied female
avatars to experience an episode of gender-based violence at home. Following the
experience, male abusers improved their ability to recognize emotions in women’s
faces.
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Chris Milk, a filmmaker, storyteller and visual artist, made a
vigorous claim when he deemed VR “the ultimate empathy
machine” in a 2015 TED talk that went viral (Milk, 2015).
Together with Gabo Arora, he is the cocreator of Clouds Over
Sidra (Arora and Pousman, 2015) a short film sponsored by the
United Nations, in 360◦ VR video format, which tells the story
of Sidra, a 12-year-old Syrian girl in a refugee camp in Jordan.
It aims to raise awareness of the humanitarian crisis provoked
by the war in Syria. The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) has also used VR in several funding
and awareness campaigns7. In addition, other civil society
organizations have pursued the idea of VR as an empathy
machine. For instance, international animal rights NGOs such
as Animal Equality (which has set up the project iAnimal using
VR to transport people to real slaughterhouses and intensive
breeding farms to witness the life of many animals in the meat
and dairy industry from a first person perspective8) and People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (with the VR projects I,
Chicken, I, Orca, and Eye to Eye) illustrate the power of VR to
foster empathy, in those cases, for non-human beings. Some large
companies have also launched various projects focusing on the
potential of VR for social transformation such as HTC’s VR for
Impact or Oculus’s VR for Good9,10.
The interpretation of VR as the ultimate empathy machine
may seem exaggerated, but there is an element of truth to
it. For instance, Herrera et al. (2018, p. 2) acknowledge the
conception of VR as an empathy machine “since it allows people
to viscerally experience anything from another person’s point
7Even though there is already a national survey experiment in the United States
pointing out the positive results of a written perspective-taking exercise
encouraging short-term inclusionary behavior toward Syrian refugees (Adida
et al., 2018), there is little empirical research on the effects of VR in relation to
refugees. See, for instance, Schutte and Stilinović (2017) and Sundar et al. (2017).
However, there are also detractors of these types of projects. Paul Bloom, famous
for his book Against Empathy (2016), published an opinion piece entitled “It’s
Ridiculous to Use Virtual Reality to Empathize with Refugees” in The Atlantic
in 2017: https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/virtual-reality-
wont-make-you-more-empathetic/515511/ (accessed February 12, 2019).
8See https://ianimal360.com/ (accessed February 7, 2019).
9See https://vrforimpact.com/ and https://www.oculus.com/vr-for-good/
(accessed July 16, 2019).
10An interesting question is why VR has been welcomed so enthusiastically with
respect to empathy, unlike other areas of technological media. There are two
possible explanations for this. The first is that new media and the rise of the
internet have been partially blamed for the decrease in the empathic tendencies
of the latest generations. In a prominent cross-temporal meta-analysis conducted
on American college students between 1979 and 2009, Konrath et al. (2011)
showed a considerable decline on the Empathic Concern and Perspective-taking
subscale of these young adults, according to the Multidimensional Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980, 1983) of dispositional empathy scale. That study
also indicated that both affective and cognitive empathy had sharply dropped
after 2000. Comparing 1979 with 2009, the subscale score had decreased by 48%
in Empathic Concern and by 34% in Perspective-taking in American college
students (Konrath et al., 2011, p. 186). This decline correlates, on the one hand,
with the increased mass consumption of cable television, new internet media,
smartphones, and self-promoting social networks, and, on the other, with changes
in self-oriented traits such as the increase in psychological scales of individualistic
self-esteem and narcissism (Konrath, 2013). Secondly, we believe that there is more
confidence in VR than in these other new types of media, as a form of empathy
enhancer, precisely because it is believed that VR technology has a greater potential
for immersion, embodiment, and emotional impact on the user.
of view.” In addition, Bollmer (2017, p. 63) considers that the
term “empathy machine” is very often used to characterize VR
because it “refers to any attempt to make sensible to oneself the
emotional experience of another via technology, often with the
goal of inhabiting another body.” VR could be used, therefore,
as a technological means of triggering very different empathic
processes in participants.
It is worth mentioning that many of the previous examples
of the uses of VR as an empathy machine stand out for their
impact on emotional responses and the consequent objective of
fostering emotional empathy (personal distress) and/or empathic
concern. We have already noted in the Introduction section that
360◦ VR videos are a promising tool for storytelling. In this
sense, many advocates of the empathy machine concept have
viewed VR as a particularly effective medium in communicating
emotionally-charged stories. Many of the 360◦ VR videos that
are driven by mass-consumption and which seek to provoke
empathy in specific targets, raise awareness of specific social
problems, or change mindsets in relation to certain issues, are
also compelling narratives that elicit highly emotional reactions
in users. Following Fisher (2017, p. 233–236), VR often produces
so-called “empathic actualities,” that is, emotionally-charged
experiences whose impact could sometimes result in sympathy
or compassion11.
In our opinion, we should be wary of these VR empathy
machine projects for two reasons. The first is that we still have
little empirical evidence on the effects of these VR cinematic
experiences and, moreover, from the little we do have, there
seems to be little difference in terms of empathy between 360◦
VR and watching the same video on a screen. The second reason
for limiting expectations is that there are certain ethical caveats
linked to the emotional component of these experiences.
With regard to the first, some studies deflate the hype of
360◦ VR as the ultimate empathy machine. Bang and Yildirim
(2018) showed that experiencing the documentary After Solitary
in a commercial VR headset was not substantially different from
seeing it on a desktop computer via YouTube 360◦ in terms of
the resulting state empathy levels. In Archer and Finger (2018),
both immersive conditions and non-immersive conditions
outperformed the text condition in eliciting empathic responses.
However, there was no statistically significant difference between
the two; that is, displaying the video on an HMD was not much
better in producing empathy than on a two-dimensional desktop
monitor. Similarly, with regard to immersive journalism, Sundar
et al. (2017) compared three storytelling media showing that
participants in VR and non-immersive 360◦ video conditions
were more empathic toward the characters than when reading
the text on which the stories were based (the New York Times’
The Displaced and The Click Effect), there being an unsubstantial
difference between VR and 360◦ video. Weinel et al. (2018)
11Furthermore, the potential of easily provoking emotional responses is not only
a feature of 360◦ VR videos. Felnhofer et al. (2015) demonstrated how computer-
generated virtual scenarios can purposely lead to different affective states (e.g., joy,
boredom, anger, or anxiety). They study how the creation of different virtual parks
may intentionally attempt to condition mood and agitation by producing diverse
levels of psychophysiological arousal.
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also found in a study on autism that VR cardboards offer
limited benefits over 360◦ YouTube video formats with regard
to generating empathy. An exception to these results is the
study of Schutte and Stilinović (2017) in which the VR format
resulted in greater engagement and a higher level of empathy
(empathic perspective-taking and empathic concern) for the
refugee protagonist of the previously mentioned Clouds Over
Sidra than a control two-dimensional format. Overall, most of
the previous studies show that, while cinematic VR can certainly
promote empathy, the differences between this medium and the
desktop video format are not as vast as some theorists of the
VR as an empathy machine might dream. Still, these studies
have some limitations. Almost all have been conducted with
university students or young participants, the size of the samples
is predominantly small—except for Archer and Finger (n: 180)
and Sundar et al. (n: 129)—and the moderating effects of first-
exposure and familiarity with VR were largely underexplored—
again except for Archer and Finger, who suggested that novelty or
over-familiarity with the VR experience, as well as choice of topic,
correlated with the level of empathic responses. Consequently,
one thing remains clear: further empirical evidence is needed
to validate the distinctive potential of cinematic VR over
other media to prompt empathic responses. To this end, in
the next section, we will present some virtual embodiment
experiments that provide more promising empirical support of
empathy-related altruistic and prosocial motivations after the
virtual experiences.
With respect to the second, the fact that 360◦ VR might have
a stronger impact on emotions than other mediums is important
from an ethical point of view. If the content is highly tendentious,
modifying the emotions of the user directly (without providing
contrasted information or serious data about reality) could lead
to undesirable immoral behavior. Due to its strong impact on
emotional responses, when these are manifest and deliberate,
this medium could lead to unwitting manipulation or failure to
improve rational thinking, which has led to demands for greater
responsibility on the part of producers (Slater and Sanchez-Vives,
2016, p. 34; Bailenson, 2018, p. 206).
This risk is higher in VR experiences whose immediate
consequence is triggering emotional contagion or immediate
motivation, which we consider the least neutral aspects of
empathy. Emotional contagion (personal distress) and empathic
concern are frequently biased toward the people closest to
us. It is easier for us to share the emotions of our relatives,
friends, pets, and the people that we resemble physically. There
are kinship and racial variables that also have an influence
on the emotional mirroring or triggering process, which is
probably a psychological consequence of evolution (de Waal,
2012; Zaki, 2014, p. 1610). In fact, this automatic disposition
is present in other animals, especially mammals, for which
emotional contagion plays an essential role in parental caring
and nurturing (Decety and Cowell, 2014)12. Thus, the altruistic
motivation triggered by emotional mirroring is often considered
a low-level, basic or rudimentary form of empathy. It has also
12Empathic concern is likewise a consequence of evolution (Decety and Cowell,
2014; Batson et al., 2015, p. 6). See also de Waal (2012).
been suggested that these types of empathy are not genuinely
significant to morality (see Prinz, 2011a,b, Masto, 2015, p. 76,
Bloom, 2016).
In addition to the parochial tendency to empathize more
easily with in-group members, empathic concern elicited from
emotional mirroring does not necessarily give reasons to act, but
mainly emotions to act. Therefore, an attempt to enhance human
morality by stressing the emotional dimension of empathy would
prove unsuccessful and incomplete. By no means are we stating
that the examples that we have previously mentioned in this
section are ethically dangerous or unworthy. To be fair, in
addition to the compelling narratives, most of the activists’ VR
proposals are founded on accurate descriptions of social reality.
What we are claiming is that caution and paused reflection
should be exercised even more in the cases in which emotions
are the protagonists of the VR experiences. In the Further
Ethical Aspects: in Defense of a Reason-Guided Empathy, we
will explain in greater detail a defense of rational control over
the emotional engagements triggered by empathic processes.
Moreover, these previous examples do not necessarily intend
to improve empathic abilities themselves, but rather to provoke
social changes through the impact that VR technologies might
have on empathic responses. This does not take away from their
merit, but does make them weaker candidates in the virtual
training methods for empathy enhancement.
VIRTUAL REALITY EMBODIED
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
The world’s leading labs that are studying the relationship
between VR, empathy and prosocial motivations have been
particularly interested in the use of this technology to change
participants’ perspective through virtual embodiment. There is
a growing body of scientific literature providing experimental
studies on the so-called “Virtual Reality Perspective-Taking” in
the articles of Herrera et al. (2018) and van Loon et al. (2018),
which would be similar to the kind of cognitive empathy that
Davis called perspective-taking. Here, we will label them “Virtual
Reality Embodied Perspective-Taking” (VREPT) in order to add
to the relevance of the embodied aspect, which we consider
essential to these experiences13. In our opinion, this is the most
promising form of VR empathy enhancement, both in terms of
general efficacy and in terms of ethical permissibility, provided
that certain precautions are taken and which we will discuss later.
The potential of VREPT for the reduction of some biases and
discriminatory attitudes, along with the increase of prosocial and
altruistic motivation, is empirically well-supported. However,
beyond the consequences and promising results, we believe that
it remains controversial if empathy in general, and cognitive
empathy in particular, are the causal psychological mechanisms
behind those results. In fact, at the end of this section we will
13Bertrand et al. (2018) also argued that the embodied dimension is crucial for
the potential to learn empathy-related abilities in VR. They speak about the use of
immersive embodied virtual reality (EVR) for this purpose. Schoeller et al. (2019)
also use the EVR acronym.
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present a study of Bedder et al. (2019) that challenges this
widespread assumption.
As we have pointed out in the Introduction section, VR offers
the possibility of inhabiting another virtual person by means of
body transfers into digital avatars. VREPTs can foster empathic
abilities, allowing people not only to metaphorically walk a mile
in another person’s virtual shoes, but also to literally embody the
virtual representation of the specific social target in whom they wish
to increase empathy. This is very important because embodied
social cognition theories signal that our bodily depictions, which
are fundamental to our social identities, also play a decisive role
in the VR empathic processes of merging our self-representations
with others (Maister et al., 2015, p. 6; Parsons, 2015, p. 13; and see
Bedder et al., 2019). It is easier to empathize with people (targets
of the empathic process) who have an analogous body identity
(similar representation of the personal body) to the subject that
is empathizing. VREPTs therefore boast the undeniable virtue of
allowing for the embodiment of virtual out-group avatars with
whom we differ in our social and bodily identities. The range of
VREPT studies includes experiences such as embodying other
skin tones, genders, ages, members of disabled groups, people
in situations of extreme social exclusion, and even other species.
The results of these studies are worthy of mention14. Seinfeld
et al. (2018), for instance, embodied male offenders in female
avatars to experience a household scene of virtual verbal abuse
and intimidation by a male character with whom they interacted.
Prior to the virtual experience, offenders had shown a poor
ability to recognize emotions in facial expressions (especially
fear in female faces) in comparison to other males in the
experiment control condition. After this vivid experience from
the perspective of a female victim, domestic abusers reduced
their tendency to misclassify facial expressions (which is an
empathic deficiency), thus improving their emotion recognition
skills, which may prove important to fostering the efficacy of
rehabilitation programs.
Moreover, having people embody avatars of very different ages
from their own has found, on the one hand, that mothers who
had been transferred into a virtual 4-year-old child increased
their levels of empathy for them, and even more so if they had
been scolded by their virtual mother (Hamilton-Giachritsis et al.,
2018). On the other hand, having people embody a virtual elderly
person was more effective than a traditional perspective-taking
task for reducing ageism in contexts where the intergroup threat
was not direct (Oh et al., 2016).
VREPT has also been used to empathize with members of
disabled groups. On the one hand, Ahn et al. (2013) found
that embodiment in red-green colorblind avatars leads to more
helping behavior toward the members of this collective in the
real world. Participants invested twice as much time helping
14There was an earlier experiment in which the embodiment aspect was not
exploited, but whose objective was to reduce the negative stigma attached to
people with schizophrenia through VR. Kalyanaraman et al. (2010) discovered
that experiencing the point of view of a person with schizophrenia (through a
VR simulation of auditory and visual hallucinations while visiting a grocery store
pharmacy), in addition to a thought-listing exercise, induced the highest empathy
score of all experimental conditions. It is a meaningful example of the potential for
VR users to walk in the shoes of people with severe mental illnesses.
them compared to those who had only imagined the experience
of being colorblind. On the other hand, another experiment
on disability simulation by Chowdhury et al. (2019)—intending
to strengthen empathy and positive attitudes toward disabled
people—found that the embodied experience via a virtual avatar
sitting in a wheelchair led participants to score lower on the
Implicit Association Test, consequently exhibiting fewer negative
associations toward people with disabilities. The positive change
in bias was, moreover, significantly greater under VR HMD
conditions than in non-immersive desktop conditions15.
Furthermore, Herrera et al. (2018) conducted a pioneer
longitudinal study on empathy and VR whose objective was to
embody participants in homeless people. It found that over the
course of 8 weeks VREPT was more effective in eliciting positive
attitudes toward homeless citizens (even signing petitions for
help initiatives) than other less immersive perspective-taking or
traditional exercises. However, despite the long-lasting prosocial
behavior elicited by that VREPT, and even though Herrera
et al. (2018) labeled it “long-term empathy,” they also found
that the empathic feeling toward the homeless was observed
at similar rates under traditional perspective-taking and virtual
embodiment conditions.
Racial embodiment has also been one of the most prominent
lines of this research. VREPT of light-skinned participants in
dark-skinned avatars diminished their implicit racial bias (Peck
et al., 2013), with the effect lasting at least 1 week after only one
exposure (Banakou et al., 2016). In addition, Hasler et al. (2017)
showed that racial embodiment can also help to curb in-group
bias in mimicry. They embodied female Caucasian participants
in a black virtual body, showing increased mimicry of a black
virtual counterpart. This reversed in-group mimicry favoritism
was expressed regardless of the participant’s level of implicit
racial bias and occurred depending on their virtual race, not
their actual racial identity. In other words, “[w]hen embodied
in a Black virtual body, White participants treat Black as their
novel in-group and Whites become their novel out-group”
(Hasler et al., 2017, p. 1). This study is interesting with regard
to low level empathy because behavior mimicry is related to
rudimentary forms of empathic mirroring. It may also be another
fruitful starting point for future research on racial embodiment
and empathy—although probably not the most interesting with
regard to ethics for the reasons already explained at the end
of the previous section. In addition to this evidence, VREPT
in another race avatar can also lead to negative outcomes. In
the first full-body racial embodiment experiment, Groom et al.
(2009) reported that Caucasian participants who had embodied
dark-skinned avatars showed greater implicit racial bias outside
the virtual environment. The racial embodiment was carried
out during a job interview—an unpleasant and competitive
scenario often associated with racial biases and discriminatory
15The Projet RÉVE (RÉalité Virtuelle et Empathie), supported by the French
Ministry of Education and conducted with the help of Be Another Lab, is
also attempting to develop the use of VR to raise awareness in teachers about
some disabilities in students, such as offering immersive experiences from the
perspective of a dyslexic pupil. See https://www.education.gouv.fr/110bislab/
cid143142/projet-reve-realite-virtuelle-et-empathie.html (accessed September 26,
2019).
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attitudes. This hostile social setting could explain the negative
results. According to Hasler et al. (2017, p. 11), the fact that
the social interaction involved in the study of Groom et al.
(2009) did not occur in a neutral situation explains in some way
why implicit racial biases increased after the virtual experiences.
More specifically, Bedder et al. (2019, p. 7–8) propose that
magnitude and plasticity of implicit bias toward out-groups are
modulated by self-esteem due to the novel positive or negative
associations generated during the virtual embodiment. In the
hostile setting of a job interview, self-esteem is threatened and
cognitive associations with the embodied avatar are likely to
be negative. This produces a reactive self-identification with
characteristics represented by the virtual avatar, such as race,
consequently leading to an increase in implicit racial biases
after the experience (Bedder et al., 2019, p. 7–8). That said, the
moderating effects of the context in VREPT experiences merits
further exploration to understand how embodiment in VRmight
be leveraged to reduce implicit biases and increase empathy. This
could also be useful for determining which situations should be
avoided in the design of those virtual experiences due to ethical
reasons involving potential undesired effects, an issue we will
address in the following section.
In addition, Ahn et al. (2016) embodied people in non-human
avatars such as virtual cattle16 and virtual coral (in the latter case
experiencing an acceleration of the ongoing ocean acidification)
to promote engagement with environmental problems and
foster interconnection with nature. Another notable experiment,
while not exactly pursuing the study of perspective-taking, had
participants embody human “superheroes” (humanoid avatars
with the superpower of flight) to research possible links to the
promotion of prosocial behavior. The results showed that the
helping behavior of these participants increased in the real world
after the experience (Rosenberg et al., 2013).
One of the baseline ideas underlying these experiments is that
empathy (especially in its cognitive dimension) is the opposite
of a “fixed quality” that is unchangeable (Bailenson, 2018, p.
81–82). Empathic perspective-taking is dependent on individual
capabilities that differ from person to person (Ahn et al., 2013,
p. 11), but is “like a muscle which one can work to increase its
strength” (van Loon et al., 2018, p. 2). This empathy “muscle”
can be trained with perspective-taking exercises. Perspective-
taking is the psychological process of imagining the world from
another person’s point of view (Oh et al., 2016, p. 399; Bailenson,
2018, p. 82). It is a “deliberate, effortful activity, and not one
that typically occurs automatically” (Davis et al., 1996, p. 719).
Empathy is therefore an ability that can also be cultivated (Read,
2019) and directed at will (Persson and Savulescu, 2018, p. 186
and 190). As we have noted, VREPTs are a particularly promising
activity to develop perspective-taking capabilities by inhabiting
other virtual avatars, this being “more experientially vivid” than
just imagining another person’s viewpoint (Gehlbach et al., 2015,
16Ramirez and LaBarge (2018, p. 522) has been skeptical about experiments that
have virtually embodied participants in very different ways of existence, such as in
species that differ considerably from humans like cows. The famous article What
Is it Like to Be a Bat? by Nagel (1974) could reinforce this skepticism.
p. 524). Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that VR is not
the only form of perspective-taking training.
There are various types of traditional perspective-taking
techniques for fostering empathy: mental simulations, thought
experiments, role-playing exercises, narrative constructions,
commenting graphic stories or printed vignettes, certain video
games, etc. The core strategy of all of them is to try to
imagine another person’s perspective. However, these tasks have
some shortcomings that should be addressed. First, traditional
perspective-taking exercises are an effortful activity and are often
cognitively taxing (Davis et al., 1996; Ahn et al., 2013, p. 9;
Oh et al., 2016, p. 399), which may seem exhausting to some
people. Second, this cognitive effort might create a “motivational
hurdle” in many individuals, leading many to avoid attempting
to take on the viewpoint of others (Bailenson, 2018, p. 83). Zaki
(2014) explained this motivational reluctance to empathize by
virtue of three phenomena that the agent wants to avoid: the
suffering that would be experienced by identifying with the pain
of others; the material costs that helping would entail (in terms
of charitable donations, for example), as well as the consequent
feeling of guilt if it does not prove helpful; and the detrimental
effects on the individual in scenarios of hostile negotiation or
inter-group competition. Third, some individuals possess traits
or find themselves in personal situations that make it difficult
for them to put themselves in the place of others. This may
be either because they do not have the necessary skills to do
so, or because they lack the information necessary to imagine
themselves having experiences not common for them (Ahn et al.,
2016, p. 15). On the other hand, there is also a dependency on
the background of participants and their knowledge regarding
their targets. This is problematic because there is sometimes
a need for additional information due to the lack of direct
experience that is fundamental to the task; e.g., in the case of
imagining a disability such as being red-green colorblind (Ahn
et al., 2016, p. 4). Other times, there is a risk of reproducing some
biases, erroneous information, or stereotypes about the social
target. This is why researchers often prefer to engage participants
in a “mediated perspective-taking task,” providing important
and accurate information about the targets, leading the exercise
appropriately, and not “relying solely on the user’s imagination”
(Herrera et al., 2018, p. 3).
A clear advantage of VREPT is that it overcomes those
previous drawbacks of traditional perspective-taking activities.
Since VR is an experience machine, in VREPT users do not have
to imagine because they need only concentrate on their actual
experience (Banakou et al., 2016, p. 8; Seinfeld et al., 2018, p.
7). Therefore, acting or just being in an IVE is less cognitively
demanding than a traditional (mediated or not) perspective-
taking task. Moreover, VREPTs are vivid experiences with rich
sensorial nuances that provide a greater “degree of realism”
(Ahn et al., 2013, p. 10) and “perspectival fidelity” (Ramirez
and LaBarge, 2018). Also, this plurality of stimuli makes it more
difficult to “escape” from a VREPT than from other perspective-
taking exercises in which one is simply thinking from the point
of view of another person (Oh et al., 2016, p. 400). From an
embodied account to social cognition, this is also important in
relation to an accurate understanding of empathy because it relies
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on the interplay between the performance of one’s embodied
mind and a specific environment (Herrera et al., 2018, p. 4).
For instance, imagining what it would be like to spend time
in a maximum-security prison cell from the comfort of one’s
living room is not the same as undergoing a first-person virtual
experience locked behind bars in solitary confinement—even
without leaving your living room17. Most likely, the process of
empathizing with the inmate would be stronger in the second
case. Last but not least, VREPTs have a substantial advantage in
terms of avoiding “stereotypes and false comforting narratives,”
given that the “mental model of perspective of the empathic
subject can be created in great detail in VR” (Bailenson, 2018,
p. 83).
Nevertheless, caution should be exercised with the results
of the VREPTs outlined above and with future undertakings.
There is a need for more empirical support to conclude that
VREPTs are usually better ways of promoting empathy for
specific others than other traditional mediums. In that sense,
further VREPT studies should provide evidence including,
specifically, empathy-measuring scales—such as the IRI of Davis
(1983)—and also comparisons of the added value of virtual
embodiment compared to traditional perspective-taking tasks—
measuring both characteristics as in the study of Herrera et al.
(2018). Furthermore, new studies should address the role that
interactivity plays in the enhancement of empathy in VREPTs,
that is, whether having agency in IVEs significantly contributes
to perspective-taking engagement (Herrera et al., 2018, p. 32).
There is also a noteworthy absence of longitudinal studies, a
lack of diversity in the sample of some of the research and
little knowledge about the medium and long-term effect of the
interventions18. As Oh and Bailenson (2017, p. 13) point out:
“[s]ample populations in academic research typically consist of
young, upper-class, college-educated individuals, which makes
it difficult to predict the generalizability of in-lab studies. [. . . ]
future VR studies should address the long-term outcomes of
virtual interventions.” Finally, there are certain factors that still
need to be further explored. For instance, the novelty factor of VR
is something that should be researched thoroughly. The impact
of VR might decrease in relation to the level of familiarization
with the technology, affecting first-time users, and participants
who have more experience with the medium in different ways
(Oh et al., 2016, p. 407; Herrera et al., 2018, p. 30–32; Archer and
Finger, 2018). Bailenson (2018, p. 44) recalls the urban legend
of the early projections of the Lumière Brothers’ The Arrival of
a Train at La Ciotat Station, a 50-second black-and-white short
documentary, in which the audience supposedly shouted and
ran out when the train on the screen started approaching them,
precisely to contemplate the importance of the novelty factor in
every new technological advance.
17To see different VR films that denounce the United States prison system visit
https://www.projectempathyvr.com/ (accessed July 16, 2019). See also Bang and
Yildirim (2018).
18In this respect, the inquiry of Herrera et al. (2018) is a notable exception. This
study worked with a large sample of a diverse population, abandoning the typical
university campus lab in which most of the participants in the experiments are
students at the college, and using a mobile-lab unit. The effects of the VR empathy
interventions were also studied over the course of 8 weeks.
A final observation must be taken into account with regard to
these experiments. It remains controversial whether the changes
produced by these simulated illusions of body ownership are
primarily due to empathy-related phenomena. In fact, in a recent
paper by Bedder et al. (2019) it was suggested that at least
implicit bias modifications through virtual embodiment might
be better explained by a mechanistic account of bodily resonance,
that is, empathy (in any of its subtypes) would not necessarily
be the causal psychological process changing some implicit
attitudes. Conversely, bodily resonance might constitute a better
explanatory phenomenon. Bodily resonance is the “comparison
between cognitive representations of our own self-image and that
of the other” (Bedder et al., 2019, p. 1). Self-image representations
encode personal features (particularly physical and bodily ones
such as gender, skin tone, hair color, etc., but also more abstract
characteristics such as group memberships) in neural networks.
The cognitive mechanistic account of bodily resonance states
that “during subsequent perception of another agent, total output
from the self-image network is proportional to the degree of
overlap between that agent’s features and the encoded self-
image” (Bedder et al., 2019, p. 2). Accordingly, bodily resonance
could explain not only the existence of implicit attitudes but
also their modification in previous VREPT experiences. Virtual
embodiment shows that our self-image representations are highly
plastic and that they can influence social cognition by modifying
implicit biases after the VR experience.
The contribution of the latter study is noteworthy because it
indicates that there may be positive (and negative) consequences
of VREPT experiences that are not necessarily caused by
empathy-related phenomena. Bedder’s et al. proposal goes in the
same line of other cognition-based explanations—such as the
proteus effect of Yee and Bailenson (2007) and the predictive
coding models of Maister et al. (2015), Tsakiris (2017), and
Farmer and Maister (2017)—which challenge the notion that
empathy is the principle underlying mechanism of the effects
of virtual embodiment on out-group attitudes and behavior
changing. One thing that seems crucial is that perspective-
taking through virtual embodiment creates a novel association
between oneself and the other. Furthermore, it is precisely the
positive or negative self-association with the other, and not
necessarily empathy itself, that largely explains the increase or
decrease in implicit attitudes, and changes in behavior outside
the laboratory [see Farmer and Maister (2017), p. 337, 340–
343]. Indeed, mitigating implicit racial biases and strengthening
empathy toward people of other races are not the same thing.
Nevertheless, having more implicit negative associations is a
hurdle to taking on the perspective of others, to feeling what
they feel, and to eliciting the subsequent altruistic motivations.
Moreover, according to Tsakiris (2017), there are still many
unresolved theoretical questions in the domain of empathy and
embodiment in the self-other overlapping gap—and in how
they affect higher level social processes—in part because direct
empirical evidence has only recently begun to be generated.
In the face of these theoretical frameworks, and the mixed
evidence presented by the previous VREPT experiments, the
role of cognitive empathy should not be over-interpreted, but
also should not be completely neglected. Further research should
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be conducted to improve our understanding of the underlying
mechanisms that cause different behavioral effects both during
and after virtual embodiment.
In summary, we have seen that there is an interdisciplinary
body of literature in the area of VR that researches the link
between virtual embodiment and different empathic processes,
some of which are related to the cognitive ability of perspective-
taking. In this respect, it could be said that VREPTs are a
humbly promising form of empathy enhancement: “humbly”
because the research line covering them is quite recent, but
“promising” because we already have some empirical evidence
of their potential and our knowledge about them is likely to
continue growing19. However, there is a significant absence of
consideration of the ethical aspects that arise from the aim of
fostering empathy in these projects. We will approach them from
a perspective of moral philosophy in the next section.
FURTHER ETHICAL ASPECTS: IN
DEFENSE OF A REASON-GUIDED
EMPATHY
Empathy does not equate to moral behavior. So, why should we
believe that empathy enhancement is often ethically desirable?
To answer this question, there are several points that must be
addressed. In this last section, we will first set out the moral
development and ethical framework to defend the notion that
empathy has an important role in human morality, showing that
it is also conditionally necessary from an ethical point of view.
This will not prevent us from later highlighting its shortcomings.
We will address the moral implications of empathy in general,
and of VREPTs in particular, and will show some of the most
recurrent criticisms of the moral relevance of empathy. These
drawbacks must be taken seriously. We will thus propose three
ethical requirements for a reason-guided empathy in order to
counterbalance these shortcomings. Then, we will point out two
advantages which make empathy an ability that very often is
morally desirable. Finally, provided that the above requirements
are met, we will consider the possibility that VREPTs may be an
ethically acceptable technology to improve empathy.
The ordinary and pre-theoretical concept of empathy denotes
that empathy is something positive or even desirable (Battaly,
2011). The general folk view is that empathy is necessary because
by allowing us to take on the perspective of others and/or to
share the feelings of others we are more likely to behave morally,
for example, by helping those most in need. However, for some
specialized critics, if what is at stake is helping others, this can
be achieved without having to evoke empathy. It would suffice to
have firm determination to do what reason tells us is correct, and
reason will dictate that we all have, for instance, the same right
not to suffer. Therefore, to be moral and to attend to others does
not require any emotional state or special knowledge about others
(McGeer, 2007; Maibom, 2009; Goldie, 2011; Harris, 2013).
19Something similar is stated by Louie et al. (2018, p. 750–1) about this “nascent”
and “promising” literature.
Nevertheless, as many philosophers have historically
maintained, knowing what and why something is right is no
guarantee of being motivated to bring our moral judgments
into action. The weakness of will is persistent in human moral
psychology. Sometimes we need emotions to move us to do what
we are advised to do by reason. Likewise, at other times, as in the
case of violent impulses, it is better to be free of the emotions
that prevent us from following a reasonable course of action.
In the face of this, there are rationalist authors who have
recently argued, in the debate on moral enhancement, that
morality cannot be a matter of having the proper emotions.
Influencing individuals through biotechnological interventions
to do the right thing by relying on better emotions means
converting morality into precisely what it ought not to be: a
domain where decisions are automatic and lack a deliberative
process (Harris, 2010, 2013, p. 172). We agree that morality
cannot be reduced to only having the right emotions but we
disagree with the premise that, on the contrary, the only thing
that matters in morality is reason. Psychology and neuroscience
show that moral decision-making is highly complex: cognitive
and deliberative aspects are important, but intuition and
emotions also play a pivotal role. Actually, the areas involving
feelings in our brain are activated when we make moral
judgments (Crockett et al., 2010).
A proper criticism of the ethical need for empathy could
therefore only come from someone who does not question the
relevance of emotions. This is the criticism raised, for instance,
by Prinz (2011a, b). This author maintains that morality is
essentially based on a strong feeling of disapproval toward certain
behaviors that harm others which are generated by identification
with the victim or fear of punishment. He argues that to
disapprove of such behaviors we need only realize that they
are harmful to someone. We agree with Prinz that this is the
usual way we act and that, therefore, in most cases, we do not
judge an act as wrong because at that moment we empathize
with the victim, but rather because we simply disapprove of it.
However, this does not invalidate the claim that empathy is a
crucial element to adopting this feeling of disapproval.
For the development of moral sense, we need to imagine
how others will react to the rules with which we intend to
govern our own conduct. To do so, the mere emotional imitation
Prinz refers to must be completed and transformed through an
understanding of the other’s state of mind, especially when it
does not correspond to simple emotions. These cognitive abilities
related to empathy normally develop in children between 4 and
5 years old, leading them to become progressively involved in
cooperative and altruistic activities and to perceive antisocial and
aggressive behavior as negative (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg, 2000;
Hoffman, 2000; Decety and Meyer, 2008).
The importance of these empathic abilities becomes more
noticeable when we look at the cases where they are absent,
for instance, in psychopaths. In this situation, the process of
conferring specific gravity to the moment of breaking moral
norms does not take place. Normal infants, through imitation
and emotional contagion, associate behavior that makes others
cry with feeling bad. But over time, this mere contagion is
complemented with an ability to imagine the reactions of others,
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which will lead them to relate the suffering of others to morality
and, in this way, to recognize the greater prescriptive force of
moral rules in comparison with conventional ones (Blair et al.,
1995)20.
By virtue of all this, we believe that empathy is necessary
for moral development in general ethical terms. However,
this does not negate the fact that empathy can sometimes be
counterproductive and that it often requires some correction.
Next, we will observe these ethical disadvantages of empathy
and the extent to which VREPT could overcome them and
therefore turn empathy training into a desirable conditioned
moral enhancement.
The first concern regarding the ethical significance of empathy
has already been pointed out at the end of the Virtual Reality
as an “Empathy Machine”. Empathy in general, and more
particularly the ability to vicariously feel the emotions of others,
is biased. The isomorphic response to other people’s affective
states is conditioned by factors such as social identity or group
membership; in other words, we pay more attention to the
emotions of people with whomwe share familiarity, affiliation, or
similarity (Bertrand et al., 2018). While this parochial tendency, a
consequence of our evolutionary moral psychology, could prove
alarming, it should not entail a rejection of fostering empathy
across the board. Moreover, as we have seen, VREPTs offer the
possibility of embodying avatars with whom people differ in
their social identity, such as gender, skin tone, age, economic
class, group membership, biological species, etc21. If sharing the
emotions of people with other social identities or with whom
we do not have regular contact is indeed harder, VREPTs could
be used to limit this propensity. In the event it is proven that
the cognitive empathic changes are the underlying mechanism of
the positive behavioral effects of virtual embodiments described
20An objection to this could arise from the case of autistic people who, despite
their lack of empathy, can come to respect moral rules. However, empirical
studies suggest that the moral norms governing the behavior of autistic people
are perceived by them as conventional norms. They explain moral wrongness in
terms of the violation of a norm but without relating this to physical or emotional
harm to others (De Vignemont and Frith, 2007; Hobson et al., 2009). They have
some emotional responses but these cannot be empathic either because they lack
the capacity to imagine themselves in the minds of others and because of their
persistent self-centered perspective (De Vignemont and Frith, 2007).
21We might wonder if the use of VREPTs for empathy enhancement might be
susceptible to ethically questionable use. Isn’t there a risk that this technology
will be developed and eventually used to increase our empathy not toward the
discriminated people or victims of aggression, but toward the discriminators or
aggressors? Given our previously-mentioned understanding of the important role
that empathy plays in our moral development and the fact that this basically
consists of associating the strength of moral rules with the protection of all people
from suffering and harm, we believe that, in general terms, this potential use
of VREPTs to empathize with abusers would be ineffective. Still, some studies
suggest that some people, under certain circumstances (such as previous similar
experiences as an abuser or gender ties), would be surprisingly willing to empathize
with rapists and corrupt people (see Konrath and Grynberg, 2016). Moreover,
this technology may have unforeseen effects that are ethically reprehensible and
should be anticipated by the designer. Bearing in mind that in the experience of
virtually taking the perspective of another, we tend to get carried away by the
facts that we are witnessing and not by the causes motivating the facts. This may
sometimes prevent the understanding of exceptional, justifiable aggressions or
apparent discriminations and therefore lead to a misplaced empathy toward the
victim.
above, VR could offer experiences to empathize with out-group
people and other social targets.
Therefore, the first limitation of empathy could be mitigated
with a requirement of target specificity. This requirement entails
that a subject should be assisted in the effort to empathize with
a specific target with whom he or she finds it more difficult to
empathize when there are goodmoral reasons to do so. Assuming
the VREPT meets this criterion, when one embodies an avatar of
another skin color, empathy is not fostered only with respect to
that particular individual, but with respect to all the individuals
with whom the avatar shares the same skin color and to whom
we ascribe the same social group. Accordingly, VREPTs might
become a helpful technological tool to reduce sexism, racism,
ageism, ableism, speciesism, and other forms of discrimination.
In those cases in which VREPTs are used to foster empathy
for specific social targets, an ethical consideration that should
be stressed in this regard is the moral responsibility of
representation in virtual reality (Brey, 1999, p. 10–13); that is,
the responsibility of designers and creators of the experiences
to avoid biases and unjustified idealization regarding avatars. It
should be remembered that although avatars are digital beings, in
these cases they can be considered representatives of real groups.
As such, it would be very useful if, prior to the design of these
VR empathy enhancement devices, studies were conducted on
marginalized groups in which members of these groups actively
collaborated and presented their experiences.
Another important implication of this requirement for
designers is the acknowledgment of the difficulty of reducing
the social and individual complexity of the target in whom we
wish to raise empathy. An adequate empathic attitude toward
marginalized groups requires recognition that such marginality
can be experienced differently by members of the same group.
This occurs by virtue of the existence of different personalities
and contexts or because one also belongs to another marginalized
group. Failure to realize this could lead to a very simple, rigid and
stereotyped knowledge of the reality of these groups that could
even jeopardize the achievement of highly efficient altruistic
behavior. Therefore, it is very important that designers configure
devices based on the experiences of different individuals in each
group so that the user perceives the plurality of the group and the
particular features of its members.
A second precaution that must be considered from an ethical
viewpoint is that empathy could lead to morally incorrect
behavior. Moral behavior can be incorrect due to specific actions
or omissions. Sometimes, in truly serious situations, a personal
distress can saturate, paralyze, and even lead to inaction when
the morally correct thing to do is to act (Masto, 2015, p. 78–
79). Other times, empathic concern can induce an altruistic
action that could be considered morally wrong if it is partial
and unfair (Batson et al., 2015, p. 17). Some experiments in
which the participants were asked to decide on the distribution
of resources affecting the well-being of others have shown that
those who were induced to feel empathy tended to act in violation
of the principles of justice more than those who were not
induced to do so, distributing the resources preferentially to the
individual toward whom they felt empathy (Batson et al., 1995).
It is therefore important to note that prosocial dispositions like
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empathy are not always morally desirable. This is because of the
complex, nuanced, and contextual nature of morality. There are
certain types of actions that are right in some situations and
wrong in others. Hence, empathizing in some specific situations
could be morally desirable, but in others it could lead to immoral
consequences. For instance, it would be morally inappropriate to
promote a judge’s empathy for the accused who she is going to
sentence, as this could lead her to unfairly favor the accused.
This second limitation of empathy must also be taken into
account when preparing new VREPT experiences. If empathy is
not always desirable, there are both virtual and real situations
in which the saliency of empathy should not be encouraged.
We therefore need a second criterion, that is, the requirement of
context dependency. This requirement establishes that empathy
should be especially strengthened in situations in which empathy
is morally important to make proper decisions in order to do the
right thing.
The increase of an ethically acceptable empathy does not
always occur under the same conditions. Different situational
characteristics, social contexts and group, or individual
characteristics could give rise to different results when attempting
to increase empathy. For instance, experimental studies show
that this contextual dependence occurs when oxytocin is used to
increase empathy. Empathy increases considerably in contexts of
interaction with relatives, but little in situations of competition
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009), uncertainty (Declerck et al.,
2010), institutional inefficiency (Zak, 2008) and interaction
with strangers (De Dreu et al., 2010). Likewise, the use of
oxytocin produces differing levels of empathy depending on
the personality of the individual to whom it is administered. In
particular, it would be less effective for those who were previously
less empathic (Abu-Akel et al., 2015) or were less willing to show
empathy (Rodrigues et al., 2009; Barraza, 2010); for children who
received little attention from their parents (Carter, 2003); for
violent people (DeWall et al., 2013); or simply for men rather
than women (Hurlemann et al., 2010). Presumably, many of
these contextual limitations will also be present when using
VREPT instead of oxytocin to enhance empathy. Moreover, the
previously discussed experiment by Groom et al. (2009)—in
which racial bias was increased when Caucasian participants
were embodied in a dark-skinned avatar in a job interview—has
shown that non-neutral and competitive contexts may have
the opposite undesired effects. If VREPTs aim to have positive
results with regard to empathic abilities, prosocial behavior and
constructive identification with out-groups, counterproductive
virtual situations should be avoided (Farmer and Maister, 2017,
p. 343). This second requirement therefore requires that both
the use and design of these devices take these possible contextual
limitations into account.
A third downside that can be attributed to empathy is that
it is neither necessary nor sufficient in many ethical challenges.
First, there are many moral problems in which empathizing is
not necessary to reach solutions. Most of our current pressing
problems are global, such as the environmental crisis that we
face today, which is so broad and abstract that it makes it
very difficult to feel any empathic concern for the Earth as
a target, “even though personalizing metaphors like “Mother
Earth” may move us in that direction” (Batson et al., 2015, p.
16–7). In a case like this, it is dubious that empathy would be
morally necessary (if not feasible) to address the environmental
crisis in a more appropriate way. On the other hand, there are
cases in which empathy could prove helpful, or even necessary,
but in which it is not sufficient—either for proper decision-
making or to envisage the accurate causes and solutions of
morally serious problems. For instance, severe poverty is a
persistent moral injustice in which empathy could be useful to
raise awareness, but that depends on social structures beyond
individual initiatives. One could feel empathy for particular
poor people (when we encounter homeless people on the street,
even if we avoid their gaze, or an advertisement of an NGO
showing impoverished living conditions in a distant continent)22,
which could encourage increasing our helping behavior toward
them. However, combating poverty depends more on our
societal commitments than on individual willingness. Pursuing
responsibility for the unfair distribution of resources, excessive
wealth accumulation, or the legal and social advantages of rich
people is more important to reducing poverty than empathizing
with the poor. Moreover, even if the causes were clearly and
broadly agreed upon, the solutions should be implemented in
political arenas, primarily at a national and supranational level.
This third limitation of empathy should serve as a wake-up
call for not placing too much expectation on empathy in general
and on VREPTs in particular. In addition, it shows us that we
need a third requirement for cases in which greater empathy
is necessary, but is by no means sufficient. This third criterion
is that of the requirement of complementarity. This requirement
stipulates that even in cases where promoting empathy is
necessary to be a competent moral agent, we should not rely on
it alone in order to do the right thing. Consequently, VREPTs
should not serve as isolated interventions or as substitutes for
other initiatives. For instance, if VREPT becomes an effective
technology in rehabilitation programs for domestic abusers, these
experiences should not be a replacement for other therapies, but
rather another complement to the program. Group or individual
therapies led by professional psychologists to talk about gender-
based violence, sexism, emotional management, and impulse
control should not be excluded based on the use of this
technology. In fact, Seinfeld’s et al. (2018) study was conducted
in a therapeutic context in which offenders also attended a
weekly therapy group as part of a domestic violence rehabilitation
program. In addition, if we agree that more empathy is necessary
to, for instance, reduce racial aversion, an issue likely related
to brain activity23, VREPTs might assist in lessening implicit
racial biases, as shown in Peck et al. (2013) and Banakou
et al. (2016). However, the most fundamental causes of racism
are not biological, but rather social discourses that promote
discrimination against people from whom we differ physically,
22According to Bloom (2016), empathy is a spotlight that permits us to focus on
certain people here and now, but is shortsighted and innumerate. It thus facilitates
the ability to empathize with specific people, but not with the suffering of groups,
favoring the one over the many.
23Gazzaniga (2005) and Douglas (2008, 2013) mentioned some neuroscientific
studies that show a relationship between the amygdala and racial aversion.
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culturally and genealogically. Therefore, while reducing implicit
racial biases via technology would be ethically favorable, racism
should first and foremost be combated by providing good
reasons, including empirical knowledge and ethical values24.
These three ethical criteria (the requirements of target-
specificity, context-dependency, and complementarity), which
aim to counterbalance some of the alleged shortcomings of
empathy, constitute the backbone of a reason-guided empathy.
A reason-guided empathy is, precisely, a concept that could
subsume these three requirements. Persson and Savulescu (2018)
proposed the concept of reflective empathy to refer to the moral
significance of an empathy supervised by reason. They argued
that if empathy is “harshly disciplined” by factors such as reason
it can play an appropriate role in morality, which may be
considered ethically important (Persson and Savulescu, 2018, p.
183). Our reason-guided empathy is consequently established
along the same lines of reflective empathy. We agree that
empathy should be severely disciplined by reason, just as a jockey
has to control the horse25. After all, human beings have empathy-
regulating mechanisms and strategies that are morally desirable
(Ray and Castillo, 2019; Read, 2019). This kind of empathy can
be ethically advantageous in at least two ways.
The first considerable advantage of a reason-guided empathy
is that it can boost the motivation to behave morally. Not
coincidentally, it has been pointed out that empathy can play
an essential role in moral motivation (Masto, 2015; Persson
and Savulescu, 2018; Read, 2019). Moral emotions and moral
motivation are closely related. Empathy exercises and VREPTs
can lead to emotional identifications that can be fundamental
to promoting moral impetus26. Taking actions in order to try to
do the right thing is something that can be elicited by the major
dimensions of empathy, namely, emotional contagion, empathic
concern, and perspective-taking. Empathic concern, in particular,
is the basis for the empathy-altruism hypothesis, which postulates
that empathic concerns are related to altruisticmotivations due to
other-oriented emotional responses triggered by the suffering of
beings whose welfare we value (Batson, 2009; Batson et al., 2015).
Empathy is therefore sometimes an essential tool to appreciate
the welfare of others, perceive negative situations and emotions
(such as pain, sadness, distress, sorrow, affliction, etc.) and move
us to alleviate such suffering.
24In some cases, complementary tasks are not only an ethical requirement, but
also necessary in terms of efficacy to reduce negative stereotypes and improve
empathy levels. For instance, this was specifically highlighted in the experiment
on schizophrenia conducted by Kalyanaraman et al. (2010, p. 441–442) in which
the highest score of empathy was achieved with the VR experience plus an extra
thought-listing exercise.
25It should be deduced from the beginning of this Further Ethical Aspects: in
Defense of a Reason-Guided Empathy that we are not defending an extreme
rationalist conception of the relationship between empathy and reason.We believe
that a normative point of view unconnected to the perspectives and suffering of
others can only lead to behaviors close to the cold egocentrism of the psychopath
or, in the ethical field, to a simplistic and naïve rationalism. Therefore, we defend
the need for an inescapable complementarity between these two factors that
ultimately leads us to affirm that “empathy should be severely disciplined by
reason” and vice versa.
26By no means are we suggesting that emotions are the only source of moral
motivation. On the contrary, we believe that proper reasoning can also be morally
motivating and that sound arguments might have a strong persuasive power.
It is therefore evident that the effective moral motivation that
arises from VREPTs might sometimes be elicited by negative
emotions caused by the embodied first-person perception of
bad situations. But this also has serious risks. Kross and
Ayduk (2017) have attempted to demonstrate that the best
strategy for overcoming depression or anxiety derived from
negative memories is to face them with emotional self-distance
and consider them from a third-person perspective. Negative
memories are not positively overcome by distraction or by
trying to rationally understand them by remembering them
in the first-person. If these authors are correct, it is possible
that anyone who experiences the negative feelings of others in
order to understand what they are feeling in the first person,
through VREPT, could end up experiencing distress or even
traumatic effects27. The fact that the virtual embodiment is not
a true memory of something experienced previously, and that
the VR user is consistently aware that their experience does
not correspond to a real situation, could reduce the possible
adverse effects compared to the subjects of the Kross and Ayduk
experiments. However, the mere possibility that the mental well-
being of users could potentially be negatively affected in some
way forces us to take precautions in the use of these mechanisms
as empathy enhancers. These should only be used for this purpose
when the expected benefits outweigh the harm caused and when
the intensity or duration of the experiences are modulated so as
to avoid possible serious damage to users’ mental health28.
The second upside is that empathy can be a heuristic source
of morally relevant information. The epistemological functions
of empathy are important in human morality (Coplan, 2011;
Oxley, 2011; Masto, 2015). Other-oriented empathy is often a
reliable (albeit imperfect) source of interpersonal data that might
be valuable to accomplish an “experiential understanding” of
other beings, that is, “it provides an observer with knowledge of
another person’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior” (Coplan, 2011,
p. 17). Empathy therefore might be used to gather intelligible
information about others’ minds, states and emotions, thus
providing knowledge and understanding and making salient
other people’s perspectives (Oxley, 2011, p. 33–58). If our
personal decisions and behaviors might have an impact on other
targets, empathy often proves necessary (though not sufficient) to
anticipate their perspective and, consequently, helps in the agent’s
27This is also important in relation to the motivational outcomes of VREPTs.
According to Batson et al. (1997), self-focus perspective-taking (imagining
how you would feel in another’s situation) and other-focused perspective-
taking (imaging how another feels in a situation) have different emotional and
motivational consequences. Imagine-other perspective-taking evokes empathy-
related altruistic motivation. Imagine-self perspective-taking, on the other hand,
not only evokes altruistic motivation but can also cause personal distress with the
subsequent egoistic motivation, which inhibits helping behavior. Actually, it has
also been said that genuine empathy is the other-oriented form (Coplan, 2011).
It is difficult to establish a relationship between that account and VREPT for two
reasons. First, because VREPT potentially blurs the distinction between the self-
focus and other-focus perspectives. Second, VREPTs are showing an overarching
tendency to elicit altruistic motivations even though the overall experience in most
of the experiments was not traumatic. Admittedly, more research is needed to
predict whether the distress caused by VREPT experiences can lead to egoistic
outcomes.
28We would like to thank the reviewers for raising this point.
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moral judgment of the right thing to do (Masto, 2015). Generally
speaking, empathic abilities in the epistemological domain are
useful in informing us of the state of other beings that are morally
salient. In fact, this is not an extraordinary characteristic of our
moral life, but rather an extremely ordinary operation in our
everyday moral considerations (Masto, 2015, p. 87–91). This
is because worrying about the welfare or discomfort of others
is a fundamental trait of morality that can be elicited through
empathy. In the end, empathy is also a source of reason that have
a place in our moral deliberations.
CONCLUSION
Virtual Reality is a technology that offers several applications
in different domains of human life, such as education,
health, research, leisure time, communication, tourism, activism,
journalism, sports, art, etc. The importance of considering the
ethical aspects of VR is therefore even greater in light of
the increasingly widespread use of this technology (Madary
and Metzinger, 2016; Slater and Sanchez-Vives, 2016; Oh and
Bailenson, 2017; Bailenson, 2018; Slater et al., 2020). In this
article, we have addressed numerous ways to improve empathy-
related phenomena through VR experiences. Nonetheless,
empathy is not exempt frommorally problematic considerations.
It can be biased, it can lead to morally incorrect acts
or omissions, and it sometimes does not serve us in our
moral dilemmas. Nevertheless, it is possible to enhance our
conception, ability, and practice of empathy through the
guidance of reason. Boosting empathy through technological
means can sometimes be ethically desirable. VREPTs can
become morally strong candidates if they appropriately specify
their social targets, if the context in which empathy needs
to be developed is justified and if they are conceived as
a necessary complement to other capabilities for doing the
right thing. Better moral motivation and reinforcement of
moral epistemology are clear advantages that can be attained.
Although empathy should not have the last word in decision-
making processes, it can help to make more informed decisions
and, subsequently, to bring these decisions to action in a
motivated way, which we undoubtedly believe would constitute
moral enhancement.
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